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I. INTRODUCTION
VISIONS of death and dying have shifted as society’s moral frame-work—including its understanding of personhood and commu-nity—has shifted. As early as the nineteenth century, in the West,
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the vision of death and dying changed as medical events displaced under-
standings grounded on religious presumptions. The medicalization of
death and dying has spawned disputes about the terms of death and the
details of dying among patients, medical clinicians, patients’ family mem-
bers and loved ones, and lawmakers.
By the last several decades of the twentieth century, U.S. law granted
competent patients, and then more hesitantly the surrogate decision mak-
ers of patients without capacity, the right to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining care. The most well-known cases confirming the right of capa-
ble patients to make their own end-of-life decisions—In re Quinlan1 and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health2—involved young wo-
men in persistent vegetative states whose family members sought to with-
draw ventilatory assistance or assisted nutrition and hydration while the
patient’s physicians and/or the facility in which the patient was receiving
care preferred that life-sustaining care be continued. In a third—In re
Schiavo3—also involving a young woman in a persistent vegetative state,
a dispute about the withdrawal of life-sustaining care split the patient’s
family. The right at issue in all of these cases—sometimes labeled the
“right to die”4—gained widespread support by the end of the twentieth
century.
Soon, other types of disputes about death and dying replaced those
about a patient’s (or patient’s surrogate’s) right to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining care. This article focuses on disputes about dying that con-
trast with those involved in Cruzan, Quinlan, and Schiavo. In the disputes
considered in this article, the patient or the patient’s surrogate requests
the continuation of life-sustaining care while the patient’s clinicians, be-
lieving further care to be without purpose and potentially a cause of suf-
fering for the patient, seek to terminate care. These disputes are proving
more challenging than those in which patients or surrogates have sought
to terminate care.
Medicine and law have developed—and continue to develop—re-
sponses to these cases, but none has proven widely acceptable. Even
more, the deep discomfort that these cases provoke is troubling for all
participants. Yet, attempted solutions that mandate the termination (or
continuation) of care have been problematic. This article criticizes both
responses that facilitate the prolongation of dispute and those that dis-
place flexibility and uncertainty with rigid rules. The Texas Advance Di-
rective Act (TADA) illustrates the second type of response.5
1. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
3. No. 990-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (original trial
court order to allow removal of feeding tube).
4. Right to Die, LEGAL DICTIONARY (Oct. 14, 2016), https://legaldictionary.net/right-
to-die/ [https://perma.cc/E68W-HX4R].
5. See Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 166.001–.093 (West 2019).
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Part II of this article is offered by way of background to consideration
of the challenges presented by medical futility disputes. It summarizes
social and legal responses in the last decades of the twentieth century to
patients and patients’ surrogates who sought to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining care in the face of resistance by clinicians and hospitals, as well
as responses to the notion of brain death and to physician-aid-in-dying
(PAD) and euthanasia. Then, Part III considers disputes about care
deemed “futile”6 by a patient’s clinicians but not by the patient (or the
patient’s surrogate decision makers). These disputes have proved discon-
certing to almost all of those involved in them. Part III analyzes the chal-
lenges at the center of “futility” disputes and aims to explain the failures
of society, the law, and medicine to craft successful responses. Part IV
considers the response to futility disputes promulgated by the Texas legis-
lature. Part V then suggests an alternative approach to such cases, one
that avoids the shortfalls of the Texas law.
II. CHANGING VISIONS OF DYING AND DEATH
This part reviews responses to death and dying in the West, and espe-
cially in the United States, since the medicalization of death in the nine-
teenth century. First, it considers the development of a legal right to die.
It then reviews the notions of brain death and PAD. The concerns ad-
dressed in this part provide background for the continuing challenges
about death and dying that are reviewed in Part III.
A. THE MEDICALIZATION OF DYING AND DEATH
Beginning in the nineteenth century, Western society began to medical-
ize dying and death. With this shift, scientific authority replaced religious
authority. By the end of the nineteenth century, the physician had re-
placed the priest as the expert who attended to the dying patient.7 And
the process of dying became increasingly opaque to those involved. These
shifts were supported by the development of life-sustaining treatment, in-
cluding effective ventilatory support8 and feeding tubes.9 Those develop-
ments reshaped the process of dying during the last half-century.
6. Increasingly, clinicians refrain from using the word “futile” to describe care they
believe has no useful purpose. Alternatives to the term “futile” include “inappropriate,”
“ineffective,” and “not medically indicated.” See, e.g., Cheryl J. Misak et al., Medically
Inappropriate or Futile Treatment: Deliberation and Justification, 41 J. MED. & PHIL. 90,
90–91 (2016); Medically Ineffective Interventions, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/medically-ineffective-interventions [https://perma.cc/LTZ4-
NCHV] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
7. See PHILLIPE ARIÈS, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH 562–63 (Helen Weaver trans.,
1987).
8. See John J. Marini, Mechanical Ventilation: Past Lessons and the Near Future, 17
CRITICAL CARE, Supp. 1, 2013, at 1, http://www.ccforum.com/content/17/S1/S1 [https://
perma.cc/WY8J-PMHD].
9. See Sylvia Kuo et al., Natural History of Feeding Tube Use in Nursing Home Re-
sidents with Advanced Dementia, 10 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 264, 265 (May 2009).
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The opacity that accompanied dying began with the medicalization of
death. It has been deepened by the illusion that death could be endlessly
postponed by the prolongation of dying. That illusion encouraged a cul-
ture of lies that was appropriated by clinicians, patients, and family mem-
bers.10 Phillippe Ariès wrote of the response of a French priest, Father de
Dainville, to his own dying in a New York hospital in 1973. Speaking to a
fellow member of the Catholic clergy from the hospital’s intensive care
unit, “with tubes all over his body,” Father de Dainville exclaimed: “They
are cheating me out of my own death!”11 Ariès compares de Dainville’s
lament with Tolstoy’s description of Ivan Ilyich’s dying in the late nine-
teenth century.12 The commitment of all of those involved in Ilyich’s dy-
ing to lie about that reality “degraded the formidable and solemn act of
his death.”13
The development of effective methods for providing respiratory sup-
port14 and enteral feeding15 has allowed patients unable to breath or to
receive hydration and nourishment by mouth to continue living for signif-
icant periods of time. These developments create challenges and often
significant distress for patients and, as often, for their family members. In
the years just after these developments appeared, physicians assumed a
duty to provide life-sustaining treatment for as long as a patient contin-
ued to breathe.16 Yet, within a few decades after Father de Dainville re-
pined medicine’s redesign for dying, U.S. society and the law began to
question the presumption that a patient’s death should be denied and that
the dying process should always be prolonged. By the late 1970s, patients
and their family members openly challenged the legitimacy of that as-
sumption. The next section reviews legal responses to those challenges.
B. A “RIGHT TO DIE”?
Three cases decided in the last decades of the twentieth century and
the first decade of the twenty-first century, all involving young women in
persistent vegetative states, garnered significant public attention and
ushered in a new set of legal and social assumptions about the prolonga-
10. See ARIÈS, supra note 7, at 565–67.
11. Id. at 567.
12. See generally LEO TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYICH (1886) (Richard Pevear
& Larissa Volokhonsky trans., 2012).
13. ARIÈS, supra note 7, at 567.
14. See Marini, supra note 8, at 2.
15. See Kuo, supra note 9, at 265. Percutaneous gastrostomy tubes, developed in 1979,
have allowed for assisted feeding without surgery. See generally Percutaneous Endoscopic
Gastrostomy, 1971, CASE W. RES. U.: DITTRICK MED. HIST. CTR., http://artsci.case.edu/
dittrick/online-exhibits/explore-the-artifacts/percutaneous-endoscopic-gastrostomy-1979
[https://perma.cc/HJ5H-MF3X] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
16. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (“A
patient is placed, or places himself, in the case of a physician with the expectation that he
will do everything in his power, everything that is known to modern medicine, to protect
the patient’s life. He will do all within his human power to favor life over death.”).
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tion of life-sustaining care.17 The first of these cases, In re Quinlan,
crafted a significantly novel understanding of the right of patients or their
surrogate decision makers to seek to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
care even as the patient’s physicians sought the continuation of that
care.18 Justice Hughes, who authored the decision in Quinlan for New
Jersey’s highest court, acknowledged that physicians were almost unani-
mously opposed to withdrawing life-sustaining care.19 Yet, concluding
that, were the patient—Karen Quinlan—competent, she would have cho-
sen to have had ventilatory support discontinued,20 Justice Hughes trans-
ferred the right to authorize the withdrawal of care to Karen’s father.21
The second case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,22
is less far-reaching than Quinlan but was important when it was decided
because it provided an occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to assert its
assumption that a competent adult has the right to have life-sustaining
care withheld or withdrawn.23 The third of these cases, In re Schiavo,24
did not establish new law. The case, occasioned by a dispute between
Terri Schiavo’s husband, who wanted Terri’s life-sustaining care with-
drawn, and Terri’s parents, who wanted care continued,25 was significant
because it attracted public attention for several years, bringing squarely
into the public arena the implications of a surrogate’s efforts to withdraw
a patient’s life-sustaining care.26
By the last decades of the twentieth century, states widely promulgated
laws that facilitated advance care planning (ACP) and enabled appoint-
ment of a surrogate decision maker authorized to make medical decisions
for the principal should he or she need medical care but no longer enjoy
capacity to make his or her own medical decisions.27 Further, in 1993 the
17. See generally id.; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re
Schiavo, No. 990-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (original
trial court order to allow removal of feeding tube).
18. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671.
19. All of Karen Quinlan’s physicians, the hospital in which she was receiving care,
and the state of New Jersey opposed the request of Karen’s father, Joseph Quinlan, to
withdraw ventilatory support from Karen. See id. at 653.
20. Id. at 663.
21. Id. at 671.
22. 497 U.S. 261.
23. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court refused to identify a constitutional right for a pa-
tient’s surrogate decision maker to authorize the withholding or withdrawing of care. The
decision did not preclude states from offering that right but did not require them to do so.
Id. at 285–87.
24. In re Schiavo, No. 990-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11,
2000) (original trial court order to allow removal of feeding tube).
25. Id. at *2.
26. See, e.g., E. Racine et al., Media Coverage of the Persistent Vegetative State and
End-of-Life Decision-Making, 71 NEUROLOGY 1027, 1027–28 (2008). By the time Terri
Schiavo’s case was brought to court (at the start of the twenty-first century), people widely
relied on the internet to further discourse about matters of public interest. See, e.g., ERIC
C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND INTERNET USE IN THE
UNITED STATES: AUGUST 2000, at 8 (Sept. 2001), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
p23-207.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CZJ-LBW2].
27. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(1)(b) (McKinney 2019). In 1990, Con-
gress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388
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Uniform Law Commission, through the Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act (UHCDA), identified surrogate decision makers in order of priority
for patients without capacity who had left no guidance while competent.28
By that time, most states had already promulgated ACP laws.29 As a re-
sult, only a few states appropriated the model supplied by the UHCDA.30
However, most state laws did facilitate surrogate decision-making for pa-
tients without capacity, whether or not a particular patient completed
ACP documentation.31 These laws have institutionalized the right of the
autonomous individual to make medical decisions, even if those decisions
are likely to result in death, and the right to exercise one’s autonomy
vicariously through a surrogate decision maker.
As important, in 2015, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services
(CMS) finalized two payment codes that covered the cost of clinicians’
conversations with patients about their medical preferences should they
become seriously ill but no longer enjoy decision-making capacity.32 The
codes are intended to pay clinicians for conversations with patients about
ACP documentation, including discussion of the patient’s preferences for
medical care should he or she lose decision-making capacity.33
The payment is moderate.34 However, an indirect, but very important,
consequence of CMS’s having included these billing codes is that the
codes categorize ACP conversations as a legitimate component of good
health care. In short, by the start of the twenty-first century, the right
sought in Quinlan and Cruzan—the right to die—had been accepted by
law and society in the United States.
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). That law mandates that
hospitals receiving federal money (e.g., through Medicare) respect patients’ advance direc-
tives and inform patients about the opportunity to complete ACP documentation. By the
start of the twenty-first century, all states had passed laws that facilitated ACP. See Janet L.
Dolgin, Dying Discourse: Contextualizing Advance Care Planning, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
235, 267 (2016).
28. Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 5(b)–(c), 9 U.L.A. 93 (1993).
29. See David M. English, The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and Its Progress in
the States, 15 PROB. & PROP. 19, 19–20 (2001).
30. See id. at 20.
31. See id. at 19–20.
32. Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Sched-
ule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70, 955–56 (Nov. 16, 2015).
See generally Advance Care Planning, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.: THE
MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK (Aug. 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Educa-
tion/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/AdvanceCarePlan-
ning.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8MT-CPH9]; FAQs: Advance Care Planning Under Medicare,
COAL. FOR COMPASSIONATE CARE CAL. (Nov. 2017), http://polst.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/2017.11-Advance-Care-Planning-Under-Medicare-CMS-ACP-Codes-FAQs-
CCCC.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KYB-4BEH].
33. See Advance Care Planning, supra note 32.
34. Medicare paid up to $86 for a half hour ACP conversation in 2016. Nancy K.
Zeitoun, New Medicare Rule Will Reimburse Physicians for Advance Care Planning, HOS-
PITALIST (Nov. 2015), https://www.the-hospitalist.org/hospitalist/article/122030/health-pol-
icy/new-medicare-rule-will-reimburse-physicians-advance-care [https://perma.cc/4TBN-
AAXM].
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C. BRAIN DEATH AND PHYSICIAN-AID-IN-DYING (PAD)
This section summarizes additional developments in understandings of
death and dying in the last years of the twentieth century and the first
years of this century. These include identification of the notion of “brain
death” in 1968 and the trend toward legalization of PAD. First, this sec-
tion reviews the notion of brain death. It is of significance to this article
insofar as the notion has proved consequential to continuing debate
about futile care, considered in Part III. In addition, this section reviews
the law’s response to the aid-in-dying movement in the present century.
The notion of brain death was proposed by an ad hoc committee at
Harvard Medical School in the 1960s. Less than a decade before Justice
Hughes, for the New Jersey Supreme Court, rendered the decision in
Quinlan, the committee issued its report approving of the notion of brain
death as adequate evidence of death and, thus, as an alternative to cardi-
opulmonary evidence of death.35 In short, the committee expressly identi-
fied brain death as an alternative to the cessation of breathing and heart
activity for establishing death.36 Initially, Karen’s father Joseph Quinlan
seeking appointment as his daughter’s guardian, contended in his petition
to the New Jersey courts that Karen was, in fact, dead according to brain
death criteria.37 That was not the case, a matter that Joseph later ac-
knowledged.38 However, the initial claim brought the notion of brain
death squarely into the arena of discussions about withdrawing life-sus-
taining treatment. Further, the notion suggests a paradigmatic illustration
of futile treatment. There is continuing debate about the implications of
brain-dead determinations.39 However, for those who are clearly deter-
mined to be dead, continuing medical treatment lacks justification.40
Since the early 1970s, society has become more familiar with the notion
of brain death. Every state in the United States now recognizes the neu-
rological indicia associated with the notion of brain death as a means of
establishing legal death.41 This notwithstanding, there remains doubt
among certain neuroscientists about the implications of determining
35. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition
of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 337 (1968).
36. Establishing brain death depended on the cessation of breathing without assis-
tance, reflexes, and movement, as well as a flat electroencephalogram. Id. at 338–39.
37. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Radhika Viswanathan, There’s a Surprisingly Rich Debate About How to
Define Death, VOX (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/6/17635098/jahi-mcmath-
2018-brain-death-definition [https://perma.cc/8SRL-M9T4].
40. Even if a determination of death would seem definitive with regard to the useful-
ness of continuing care, the case of Jahi McMath, who was pronounced brain dead in 2017
and dead by cardiopulmonary standards in 2018, raised new questions about the notion of
brain death. See, e.g., id.
41. Nikolas T. Niokas et al., Determination of Death and the Dead Donor Rule: A
Survey of the Current Law on Brain Death, 41 J. MED. PHIL. 237, 242 (2016). In both New
Jersey and New York, if hospitals know of a patient’s religious (or in New York, religious
or moral) objection to the notion of brain death, the hospitals must look to cardiopulmo-
nary factors in order to pronounce a patient dead. Id. at 245.
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death through reference to neurological criteria.42 As noted, the notion of
brain death and the continuing uncertainty about its implications become
important to the cases involving medical futility that are considered in
Part III of this article.
The movement to provide for PAD, sometimes referred to as physi-
cian-assisted suicide (PAS), represents an additional strand in developing
understandings of death and dying. Oregon passed the first law allowing a
physician to respond positively to a patient’s request for medical assis-
tance that will result in the patient’s death.43 By mid-2019, eight states
and Washington, D.C., provided for PAD.44 These laws authorize physi-
cians to comply with the request of a terminally ill patient to receive a
prescription for lethal medication.45 Generally, there is a mandatory wait-
ing period between the patient’s initial request for PAD and the provision
of a prescription,46 and patients must self-administer the medication.47
Between passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in 1997 and mid-
2019, 2,217 people in Oregon received prescriptions for lethal medication,
and 1,459 people died from administration of the medication.48 Many pa-
tients have sought lethal medication to preserve a choice but then die
without administering the medication.49
The movement to accept PAD as a dignified mode of death for termi-
nally ill patients has gained significant acceptance in the United States
and even greater acceptance in Europe.50 A full review of PAD is beyond
the scope of this article. Yet, the movement and its growing acceptance
within the states are important to the article insofar as they reflect a sig-
nificant transformation in social understandings of dying and death in the
42. See Joseph L. Verheijde et al., Neuroscience and Brain Death Controversies: The
Elephant in the Room, 57 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 1745, 1750 (2018).
43. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.897 (West
2018). Three years earlier, state voters passed a ballot initiative providing for PAD. That
law did not become effective. See Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., DEATH WITH
DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/assisted-dying-chronology/ [https://perma.cc/
6DG2-QSHB] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
44. Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., supra note 43. The states included Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. Death
with Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/death-with-dig-
nity-acts [https://perma.cc/46EQ-7FKL] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). In addition to these
states and the District of Columbia, Montana’s Supreme Court offered protection to physi-
cians who help patients die. However, the court’s decision did not offer a framework within
which to regulate PAD. Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211, 1218, 1220–21 (Mont. 2009).
45. See, e.g., Oregon Death with Dignity Act §§ 127.800–.897.
46. Id. at §§ 127.815(1)(h), 127.855.
47. Id. at § 127.815(1)(C)(g) (guiding patients to have “another person present” when
the medication is taken).
48. OR. HEALTH AUTH., OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: 2018 DATA SUMMARY
5 (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/providerpartnerresources/evaluationre-
search/deathwithdignityact/Documents/year21.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZB9-BAQH].
49. Id.
50. Euthanasia, not legal anywhere in the United States, differs from PAD in that it
can be carried out for patients unable to administer lethal medication to themselves.
Yvette Brazier, What Are Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide?, MED. NEWS TODAY, https://
www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/182951.php [https://perma.cc/RML7-NHVU] (last up-
dated Dec. 17, 2018).
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last half-century. The scope of the transformation can be discerned by
noting the summary of society’s vision of the physician’s role for dying or
seriously ill patients, offered by Judge Muir for a New Jersey trial court in
1975 in Quinlan:
There is a higher standard, a higher duty, that encompasses the uni-
queness of human life, the integrity of the medical profession and the
attitude of society toward the physician, and therefore the morals of
society. A patient is placed, or places himself, in the care of a physi-
cian with the expectation that he (the physician) will do everything in
his power, everything that is known to modern medicine, to protect
the patient’s life. He will do all within his human power to favor life
against death.51
That view is now a historic vestige.
III. “FUTILE” CARE?
Indeed, within a decade of the 1975 summary offered by the trial court
in Quinlan, society, lawmakers, and physicians questioned the sentiment
described; one that was widely assumed when the Quinlan case was
brought to court in the mid-1970s. That change is clearly indicated by the
appearance of the notion of futile care, raised primarily in hospital set-
tings with regard to patients deemed terminally ill. This part considers the
difficult bioethical challenges occasioned by situations in which clinicians
seek the termination of life-sustaining care, even as patients or, more
likely, their surrogate decision makers, ask that care be continued.
Section A of this part reviews factors that encouraged clinicians to
abandon the perspective ascribed to them by Judge Muir in 1975—that
doctors “will do all within human power to favor life against death.”52 It
then suggests challenges occasioned by attempts even to define futile
treatment. Today, medical clinicians do not always favor “life against
death,”53 as that phrase was understood in 1975. In a sharp reversal from
the days of Quinlan, physicians now justify the recommendation that care
deemed futile be discontinued with reference to the obligation of physi-
cian beneficence. Thus, for clinicians, definitions of futile care (often now
referred to through alternative phrases) harmonize with understandings
of clinician beneficence.
Section B summarizes the respective roles of hospital ethics consultants
and courts in responding to futility disputes. Section C focuses on two
court cases occasioned by disagreements about the presumptive futility of
a patient’s care. Then, Part IV examines one legislative response to futil-
ity disputes—that of Texas.54




54. See generally Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. §§ 166.001–.209 (West 2019).
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A. DEFINITIONS OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEEMING CARE
“FUTILE”
Howard Brody summarized the challenge presented by futile care with
two questions:
1. Are there medical interventions in a specific patient with a par-
ticular disease that we can label futile or useless because we are
sufficiently confident that they will not be beneficial?
2. If so, are physicians entitled, or indeed obligated, to refuse to
provide those interventions to the patient in question even if the
treatment is requested or demanded by the patient or appropri-
ate surrogate?55
Brody’s first question suggests the difficulty faced by anyone attempting
to define futile care. The question, as phrased, subsumes additional ques-
tions about the meaning of “sufficiently confident” and of “beneficial.”
Brody’s second question implicates lines of decision-making authority for
dying patients among the patient (whose view may be delineated in an
advance directive), the patient’s surrogate decision maker, and the pa-
tient’s clinicians. Both questions have resisted easy, satisfying answers.
This section reviews the technological and ideological factors behind con-
struction of the notion of futile care. It then focuses on the definitional
issues that continue to shape understandings of medical futility. Sections
B and C of this part, as well as the next part of this article, focus on
efforts to respond to Brody’s second question.
1. Factors that Facilitated Development of the Notion of Medical
Futility
The transformations in hospital care for dying and very ill patients dur-
ing the last several decades of the twentieth century, including the availa-
bility of respiratory support and assisted nutrition and hydration,56 as
well as the increasing readiness of law and society to grant surrogate deci-
sion makers the decisional authority that would belong to the patient
were he or she capable, occasioned increasingly complex dilemmas about
when to forego life-sustaining care.57
These disputes generally arise when a patient, or more likely his or her
surrogate, hopes to continue care that the patient’s physicians consider
futile (often characterized not as futile, but as ineffective or inappropri-
ate). For patients or their surrogates, futility disputes reflect confusion
about their presumptive right to make medical decisions, even if those
55. Howard Brody, Medical Futility: A Useful Concept?, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND
THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 1 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard
D. Zucker eds., 1997).
56. See generally Marini, supra note 8; Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastronomy, 1979,
supra note 15.
57. Alexander Morgan Capron, Foreword, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUA-
TION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS, supra note 55, at ix–x.
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decisions are not the ones that the patients’ clinicians recommend.58 That
confusion can engender patient and surrogate distrust of those providing
clinical care.
In the right-to-die cases entertained in the last few decades of the twen-
tieth century, courts assumed a patient’s right to request the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining care.59 More broadly, those cases re-
flected a process in which patient autonomy increasingly displaced physi-
cian paternalism.60 Yet, futility disputes challenge that model in that they
involve clinicians seeking unilateral decision-making authority to with-
draw life-sustaining care in cases in which they deem that care futile. In
effect, futility disputes have facilitated physicians’ successfully challeng-
ing the increasing ubiquity of patient autonomy.61
A perceived need to ration medical care has provided another factor
associated with futility determinations.62 At least in theory, however, de-
cisions about futile care and the need to ration care are distinct. The first
concerns decisions about medical care for particular patients. The second,
a matter of social justice, focuses on considerations of cost and the distri-
bution of scarce resources.63 Yet, concerns about overuse of scarce re-
sources can be the elephant in the room of futility determinations.64
2. Definitions of “Futile” Treatment
Construction of the concept of futile care has spawned definitional co-
nundrums that reflect the underlying challenge occasioned by the concept
itself. A fairly straightforward scenario suggests the extent to which defi-
nitions of futility depend on perspective. In this scenario, physicians deem
life-sustaining care futile because the condition of a particular patient,
reliant on ventilatory support and on a feeding tube, seems exceedingly
unlikely to improve. Everyone involved in medical decision-making for
this patient may accept that assessment but still not agree that care is
58. Steven R. Leuthner, Futility: Interpretation and Usefulness in Clinical Practice, 18
HEALTH MATRIX 245, 254 (2008) (“[T]he futility cases that stimulate moral distress are
really end-of-life cases; if treatment is stopped the patient will die.”).
59. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming,
“for purposes of this case,” that the Constitution “would grant a competent person a con-
stitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”).
60. See MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDI-
VIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 41 (2003).
61. See Capron, supra note 57, at x–xi. Other contexts in which the clinician’s right to
challenge patient choices has gained momentum include reproductive care and PAD. See
Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical Prac-
tice, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 88–89 (2016).
62. See Capron, supra note 57, at xi.
63. Bryan Rowland, Comment, Communicating Past the Conflict: Solving the Medical
Futility Controversy with Process-Based Approaches, 14 MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
271, 279–80 (2006). In Britain, the National Health System is authorized “to ration care
based on clinical guidelines that blend efficacy of outcomes, quality of life judgments, and
economics.” Id. at 275.
64. Mary Crossley, Ending-Life Decisions: Some Disability Perspectives, 33 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 893, 903 (2017) (noting that, in the United States, medical care is rarely rationed
overtly).
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futile. For the patient, if competent, and for the patient’s family members
and dear friends, the fact that the care at issue is necessary to sustain the
patient’s life may be enough to render that care useful. The care is doing
what they want it to do.
Dr. Bernard Lo, who characterized the term “futility” as “fraught with
confusion, inconsistency, and controversy,”65 has distinguished situations
in which it may be reasonable to deem care futile and situations in which
that characterization can more easily be challenged. In the first category
of situations, Dr. Lo included cases in which the care involved does not
have a rationale grounded in an understanding of pathophysiology;66
cases in which the patient has not responded positively to the care at
issue;67 and cases in which the care requested has been tried but the pa-
tient has not responded to it.68 Dr. Lo concluded that doctors are not
obliged to provide interventions in such situations and may even “have an
ethical obligation not to provide them.”69
Dr. Lo delineated a second category of situations in which care may be
deemed futile but in which the assessment involves “contested value
judgments.”70 These situations are viewed as more likely to occasion le-
gitimate controversy about the ascription “futile” than those in the first
category that Dr. Lo delineated. This second category of situations in-
cludes cases in which the likelihood that the proposed intervention will
help the patient is “extremely small” but more than zero; cases in which
the quality of the patient’s life is considered so poor that treatment is not
viewed as warranted; and cases in which the benefit promised seems too
small to justify the resources required to achieve that benefit.71
65. BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 71–76
(5th ed. 2013) (providing the example of a family asking for an antibiotic to which the
organism making the patient sick is known to be resistant).
66. Id. Dr. Lo illustrates the category of cases without a pathophysiological rationale
with the case of a seventy-four-year-old female suffering from septic shock. Her family
requests that a particular antibiotic be administered to the patient. The organism from
which the patient is suffering is resistant to the antibiotic that the family wants adminis-
tered. Dr. Lo comments: “No clinical or physiologic benefit can be expected.” Id. at 71. A
second illustration presents the same patient, now comatose, needing dialysis and a ventila-
tor. She is suffering from progressive multiorgan failure. Id. The patient’s doctors do not
believe that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) would restore this patient’s circulation
effectively. Id. at 72. A third illustration describes a patient for whom CPR was attempted
for thirty minutes. This did not result in a “spontaneous cardiac rhythm or circulation.” Id.
The patient’s family members asked that CPR be continued. Dr. Lo comments that “it is
pointless to continue or repeat interventions that have already failed.” Id.
67. Id. (providing the example of a patient whose circulation cannot be supported “de-
spite all appropriate therapy” but whose family asks that CPR be provided if the patient
experiences cardiopulmonary arrest).
68. See id. (providing the example of a patient suffering cardiac arrest for whom “ade-
quate” CPR is provided for thirty minutes without a response; continuing CPR would be
futile); see also Brody, supra note 55, at 2 (citing LO, supra note 65, at 71–75).
69. LO, supra note 65, at 72.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 73 (noting that some may see a one-percent chance that an intervention will
be helpful as worth attempting); see also Brody, supra note 55, at 1–2.
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A finding of futility in each of the situations included in the second
category of futility cases identified by Dr. Lo depends on the assessor’s
perspective. It is, in that regard alone, open to challenge. Dr. Lo reported
that unilateral decisions by physicians to terminate care “commonly an-
tagonize patients and surrogates.”72
Dr. Lo explained that physicians sometimes confuse futile care with
care that they do not believe serves the patient’s best interests.73 That
confusion suggests a serious flaw at the center of futility determinations.
The “best interest” rule is inevitably subjective. Conflating it with deci-
sions about the futility or usefulness of medical care reveals the underly-
ing challenge presented by the second category of futility cases that Dr.
Lo delineated.
In light of this, Dr. Lo concluded that the implications and scope of the
notion of futility may be so speculative that the notion should be aban-
doned or extensively modified.74 Alternative terms have been pro-
posed.75 Alternatives have included “medically or ethically
inappropriate” care,76 “medically ineffective treatment,”77 and care that
is “not medically indicated.”78 Such terms may suggest a broader cate-
gory of cases than does the term “futility.” However, they are often
treated as synonyms for futility. Although alternative terms do not signifi-
cantly alter the underlying conundrums raised by the notion of futile care,
they may soften the implications of the debate and reshape arguments
about futility determinations. Use of the terms “inappropriate” and “inef-
fective” care instead of “futile” care may, for instance, mitigate any sug-
gestion, potentially intuited by the patient or his or her loved ones in the
context of futility disputes, that the patient (rather than the patient’s con-
dition) has been deemed to lack continuing worth (i.e., that the patient’s
life and personhood have become futile). Yet, alternative language, pre-
cisely because it is less jarring, may prematurely sway the shape of dis-
course surrounding particular cases.
B. CLINICAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FUTILITY DISPUTES
Futility disputes are especially challenging because they are clouded by
several levels of uncertainty. A decision to withhold or withdraw care is
72. LO, supra note 65, at 74.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. This article continues to use the terms “futile” and “futility” for the sake of consis-
tency and to frame the most challenging issues at stake in these cases.
76. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-.2990 (West 2019) (medically unnecessary health
care is not required; leaving term undefined).
77. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(b)(2)(1) (West 2017) (defining
“medically ineffective treatment” as treatment “that, to a reasonable degree of certainty
. . . will not (1) Prevent or reduce the deterioration of the health of an individual; or (2)
Prevent the impending death of an individual”). Id. § 5-601(o).
78. LO, supra note 65, at 72.
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likely to result in the patient’s death, but not always,79 and there is often
uncertainty about the patient’s prognosis if care is continued. Com-
pounding these forms of uncertainty, it is not always clear who has the
ultimate authority to make medical decisions in these cases. Each level of
uncertainty can exacerbate moral distress and tension among all
stakeholders.
Well-trained hospital ethics consultants respond with significant success
to futility disputes.80 They focus on the nuances of stakeholders’ needs
and concerns and often mediate disputes about patient care so that the
parties reach agreement. The ethicist’s work is almost always labor-inten-
sive and can thus be expensive.81 When successful, it is well worth the
cost.82 Sometimes, however, ethicists are not easily accessible or are una-
ble to help the parties locate a position on which they can agree. In those
situations, most states provide dissatisfied parties the right to seek court
review.83
Judges, responsible for court review of futility disputes, do not gener-
ally understand the nuances of patient care and the stakeholders’ varied
needs as thoroughly as hospital ethicists do. However, the right to court
review is essential. It offers stakeholders an opportunity to be heard
before a presumptively neutral decisionmaker, and it provides closure to
disputes about patient care but only after the parties’ concerns have been
entertained by ethicists and then by one or more judges.
Further, some state legislatures have promulgated statutory responses
that, on the whole, have received physician support, even though the laws
have generally not provided secure safe-harbors for physicians.84 This ar-
ticle focuses on one state law—the law promulgated in Texas. The Texas
law delineates a process that promises to resolve futility disputes without
protracted litigation. This article contends that the price of the process
outlined in the Texas law is unacceptably high.
79. After Karen Quinlan’s father gained the right to authorize withdrawal of venti-
latory support from his daughter, she was weaned from the respirator that was thought to
have been sustaining her life. Yet, she lived for almost a decade after that. Jill Lepore, The
Politics of Death, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2009/11/30/the-politics-of-death [https://perma.cc/3DDS-VWHF].
80. See Janet L. Dolgin, Resolving Health Care Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Ju-
dicial and Hospital Responses, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 495, 568–74 (2019) [hereinaf-
ter Dolgin, Resolving Health Care Conflicts].
81. See Janet L. Dolgin, Medical Disputes and Conflicting Values: Is There a “Right to
Die” Later?, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Dolgin, Medical Disputes and
Conflicting Values]. Hospital ethics consultants are generally paid by the hospitals in which
they work. Ethics committee members are almost always volunteers.
82. Successful ethics consultations may save money by precluding litigation and limit-
ing time devoted to dispute resolution by clinicians. See Dolgin, Resolving Health Care
Conflicts, supra note 80, at 571.
83. The Texas law considered in Part IV of this article is an exception. See, e.g., Texas
Advance Directive Act (TADA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.001–.093
(West 2019). TADA offers court review only for very limited purposes. See infra Part IV.
84. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilater-
ally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007).
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The next section of this part examines judicial approaches to futility
disputes. Two cases serve to illustrate resolution of these disputes in
courts. Part IV then considers the Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA).
TADA’s approach to futility disputes depends on process rather than on
substantive definitions of futility. The approach is fairly straightforward
and lays out a path along which futility disputes can be decided defini-
tively. But the flaws built into the Texas law outweigh the law’s benefits.
TADA undermines due process protection and can eviscerate patient au-
tonomy, effectively denying patients and surrogates the right to court
review.85
C. MEDICAL FUTILITY IN COURT
This section considers two futility disputes about patient care that were
brought to court. The first case was initiated by a hospital physician dur-
ing the patient’s life.86 The second case, in contrast, decided seventeen
years after the first, was brought by the patient’s family after her death.87
In the first case, a Minnesota court sided with the patient’s family mem-
bers.88 In the second case, a court in California sided with the patient’s
clinicians and the hospital in which the patient received care.89
Dr. Steven Miles initiated court proceedings in In re Conservatorship of
Wanglie.90 A physician and member of the ethics committee at Hennepin
County Medical Center where Helga Wanglie was a patient, Dr. Miles
sought a court order to replace Helga’s husband, Oliver Wanglie, as
Helga’s conservator.91 Dr. Miles grounded that request on Oliver’s re-
fusal to “accept the advice and counsel of the physicians treating Helga
Wanglie and refus[ing] to consent to remove the ventilator” that was
keeping Helga alive.92 Helga and Oliver’s children supported Oliver’s
choices regarding continued health care for their mother.93
85. The statute provides for very limited appeal to a court to extend the time provided
for identifying an alternative placement for a patient whose care has been deemed futile.
Texas Advance Directive Act § 166.046(g).
86. In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991),
reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369, 370–72 (1991).
87. Alexander v. Scripps Mem’l Hosp. La Jolla, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 738 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2018). Read together, these cases—though each is significantly different from the
other—suggest the potential importance of family autonomy to the resolution of futility
disputes. The notion offers an alternative to the presumption that autonomous decision-
making belongs only to individuals and that someone must be nominated as the final deci-
sion maker. Hospital ethics consultants are generally aware of the significance of family
autonomy and its role in the deliberations that surround an ethics consultation. See, e.g.,
Sheryl Mitnick et al., Family Caregivers, Patients and Physicians: Ethical Guidance to Opti-
mize Relationships, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 255, 255–58 (2010). Family autonomy can
offer an option to decision-making by individuals (a patient, a surrogate, or a clinician).
Consideration of the implications of that suggestion is beyond this article’s reach.
88. See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 372.
89. Alexander, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 738.
90. See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 369.
91. Id. at 371.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 372.
62 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
At the time, Helga, eighty-seven years old, had suffered cardiorespira-
tory arrest and severe anoxic encephalopathy.94 She entered into a persis-
tent vegetative state and was not expected to recover.95 She was
dependent on ventilatory support.96 Helga’s clinicians viewed the care
she was receiving as inappropriate insofar as her prognosis was “dis-
mal.”97 Helga’s family viewed her care differently. For them, the care that
Helga was receiving served useful ends: it kept Helga alive.98
Judge Belois, writing for the probate court division of the Minnesota
District Court, revealed her response to the case in the first sentence of
her memorandum of law: “The Court is asked whether it is in the best
interest of an elderly woman who is comatose, gravely ill, and ventilator-
dependent to have decisions about her medical care made by her husband
of fifty-three years or by a stranger.”99
Dr. Miles had not asked the court to discern the most appropriate med-
ical care for Helga. He asked only that her husband be replaced as her
decisionmaker.100 In light of that request, Judge Belois confirmed Oli-
ver’s capacity to serve as his wife’s conservator.101 Helga, still connected
to the ventilator, died soon after the court issued its decision.102
Judge Belois privileged Helga’s family—Oliver and their adult chil-
dren—as decision makers for their wife and mother, respectively, over a
court-appointed conservator.103 In doing so, she suggested that, in the
context of disagreements about end-of-life care, medical decisions for in-
competent patients are better left to the patient’s loved ones than to the
patient’s clinicians.104 Increasingly, however, courts and legislators have
recognized the right of clinicians to refuse to provide care they deem
inappropriate.105
Alexander v. Scripps Memorial Hospital suggests that right.106 The case
resembles Wanglie as it involves the family members of a patient who
joined in seeking continued care for their loved one despite the prefer-
ence of the patient’s clinicians to terminate care. In fact, Elizabeth Alex-
ander, a seventy-year-old, died from pancreatic cancer several days after
her transfer from a nursing facility to Scripps Memorial Hospital La
Jolla,107 but her family claimed that she had inappropriately been denied
94. Id. at 374.
95. Id. at 374–76.




99. See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 376.
100. Id. at 372.
101. Id.
102. Doyle, supra note 96.
103. Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 372.
104. Id. at 377–78.
105. See, e.g., Alexander v. Scripps Mem’l Hosp. La Jolla, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 760–61
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 737.
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life-sustaining care while at Scripps Memorial.
Significantly, Elizabeth, unlike Helga Wanglie, had completed an ad-
vance directive asserting that she wanted all measures taken that could
sustain her life and appointing one of her children as her medical surro-
gate.108 Yet, clinicians at the hospital declined to provide certain life-sus-
taining care to Elizabeth, asserting that that care would cause additional
suffering for her and would be medically ineffective.109
After Elizabeth’s death, her children sued the hospital. The litigation
was prolonged.110 The plaintiffs brought a number of claims, including
professional negligence and wrongful death.111 The California appellate
court that entertained the appeal of Elizabeth’s children affirmed a trial
court decision for the defendants.112
The court noted that the hospital had informed Elizabeth’s son, Chris-
topher, her appointed surrogate decision maker, that
physicians could not provide Elizabeth with care they determined
was futile because doing so would be outside the bounds of their
ethical duties as physicians. Defendants’ decisions to withhold the
treatment requested in Elizabeth’s advance health care directive was
consistent not only with their ethical duties, but also with the [state]
Health Care Decisions Law. A physician may decline to comply with
a patient’s health care instruction that requires medically ineffective
health care, which is treatment that would not offer the patient any
significant benefit.113
The court held for the defendants, in effect trumping Elizabeth’s own
preference articulated in her advance directive that she be provided with
“all measures” that might sustain her life.114 The court justified its deci-
sion, which seems to contravene the autonomy granted to patients in
making health care decisions for themselves, by noting that physicians
who act in good faith and in accordance “with the standard of care” gain
protection from liability.115
Had hospital ethicists been able successfully to mediate among Eliza-
beth’s clinicians and her children before Elizabeth died—taking note of
108. Id. at 737–38.
109. Id. It is difficult to assess the sincerity of such claims. Robert Truog comments:
In such situations [e.g., disputes about futile care], clinicians often justify
their efforts to override the requests of family members by claiming that the
continued use of life support is causing the patient unwarranted suffering or
is contributing to an undignified death. Though sometimes valid, these argu-
ments are difficult to sustain in cases like that of Emilio [the eighteen-month-
old child discussed in Truog’s article] . . . . [P]atients who require mechanical
ventilation can always be made comfortable with sufficient doses of sedatives
and analgesics . . . .
Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2007).
110. The process of discovery took three years. Alexander, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 739.
111. Id. at 738.
112. Id. at 739–40.
113. Id. at 757–58.
114. Id. at 737.
115. Id. at 757.
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the preferences of all parties—her children might have been left less frus-
trated and angry. The litigation initiated by Elizabeth’s children took
many years116 and was presumably expensive. Yet, even as the California
courts held against Elizabeth’s children, the children were privileged to
be able to seek and obtain judicial review of their objection to the medi-
cal care that their mother received.
IV. TEXAS ADVANCE DIRECTIVE ACT (TADA)
That privilege is not afforded to patients or their surrogates by
TADA.117 The law can be understood as a response to the moral distress
occasioned for clinicians asked to provide care they find inappropriate, to
claims about safeguarding physician integrity,118 and to the high financial
cost of providing such care.119 Each of these concerns is pressing. How-
ever, difficult bioethical challenges can rarely be satisfactorily met with
responses that ignore the nuances inherent in the situations that have led
to the disputes at issue. TADA is such a response. Section A of this part
summarizes that response. Then Section B suggests some of the factors
that can result in exaggerated—and potentially harmful—statutory re-
sponses, such as TADA.
A. TADA’S PROVISIONS
TADA is worrisome. The most troubling provisions involve the stat-
ute’s attempt to provide for due process. That effort largely precludes
court review of futility disputes, relying instead on hospital ethics com-
mittees to review decisions about withholding or withdrawing care from
patients for whom the care in question is deemed futile.120 For a patient
or surrogate who continues to seek care despite the patient’s physician
and the hospital ethics committee having “conclude[d] that life-sustaining
treatment is medically inappropriate,” the only recourse is transfer of the
patient to a health care facility willing to provide the care that the patient
or surrogate is requesting.121 The patient or surrogate has ten days within
116. See id. at 739 (reporting that discovery in the case extended over more than three
years).
117. See Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.046 (West 2019).
118. See Truog, supra note 109, at 2.
119. See William Prip & Anna Morett, Medical Futility: A Legal Perspective, in MEDI-
CAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS, supra note 55,
at 136, 153. But see Truog, supra note 109, at 2 (noting that cost of care provided in cases
physicians deem futile is usually “trivial” because “such cases are relatively rare” and “the
patients usually die within a short period, even when requested life support is continued”).
120. Texas Advance Directive Act §§ 166.046, .052. One survey found that the great
majority (about seventy percent) of ethics committee decisions in futility cases supported
the physicians requesting to terminate care. Nora O’Callaghan, Dying for Due Process:
The Unconstitutional Medical Futility Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60
BAYLOR L. REV. 527, 548–49 (2008).
121. Texas Advance Directive Act § 166.052(a). The patient is responsible for the cost
of a transfer. Id. During the period given to the patient or surrogate to try to find an
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which to identify such a facility.122 The only recourse to court assistance is
for the purpose of seeking an extension of that ten-day period.123 At the
end of the ten days (or of any court-ordered extension of that ten-day
period), “life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn.”124 In effect,
TADA presumes that the hospital ethics committee offers an adequate
due process substitute for judge and jury.125
TADA presents additional concerns, some very worrisome.126 Nora
O’Callaghan has carefully and comprehensively described and analyzed
those concerns.127 Among them are the following. Initiating ethics com-
mittee review of a physician decision to terminate care need not be predi-
cated on the patient’s being terminally ill or having an irreversible
condition.128 The patient or surrogate’s only option to termination of care
is to find another facility willing to accept and treat the patient. However,
that possibility is undermined by the very fact that the patient’s clinicians
and the hospital’s ethics committee have opted to discontinue care since
an alternative facility, reviewing the patient’s case, is likely to place signif-
icant weight on the determinations of the patient’s clinicians and hospi-
tal.129 Physicians who comply with the rules that direct them to refer
futility decisions to the hospital’s ethics committee enjoy absolute immu-
nity from liability.130 This last dimension of TADA compounds, as it rein-
forces, the statute’s preclusion of judicial review of physicians’ futility
decisions.
As O’Callaghan notes:
The breadth and depth of the immunity conferred in [subsection]
.045(d) [of TADA] from all criminal, civil and administrative review
of the decisions reached pursuant to the procedures of .046 is virtu-
ally unheard of in Texas or American law and confirms its radical
departure from traditional concepts of the rule of law. Texas has con-
ferred a form of immunity to doctors and hospitals acting pursuant to
alternative health care facility, the hospital must continue to provide life-sustaining care.
Id. § 166.046(e).
122. Id. § 166.052(a).
123. Id. The success of requests to extend the time limit depend on being able to show
“that there is a reasonable expectation that you may find a physician or health care facility
willing to provide life-sustaining treatment if the extension is granted.” Id. § 166.052(a)(6).
124. Id. § 166.052(a)(5).
125. See Truog, supra note 109, at 2.
126. See LO, supra note 65, at 75 (“The Texas experience also raises concerns about
unfairness because a disproportionately high percentage of cases involved ethnic
minorities.”).
127. See generally O’Callaghan, supra note 120.
128. Id. at 541–42.
129. Id. at 544. Families or a patient seeking alternative care are required to provide the
patient’s medical records. O’Callaghan notes that “these records may be biased in reflect-
ing the doctor’s judgment that continued [life-sustaining care] is medically inappropriate.”
Id. at 569.
130. Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.045(d) (West 2019) (offering immunity to “a physician, health professional acting
under the direction of a physician, or health care facility . . . if the person has complied with
the procedures outlined in section 166.046”).
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.046 that exceeds even the broad immunity conferred on judges and
public prosecutors.131
B. WHY TADA?
TADA comprises a deeply troubling response to the practical and emo-
tional difficulties that have faced those involved in futility disputes. These
disputes have proved particularly resistant to resolution. In part, that re-
sistance reflects continuing social discomfort about a decision to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining care. In the right-to-die cases, that discomfort
was balanced, at least in part, by the privilege accorded to patient auton-
omy. In futility cases, in contrast, clinicians seek to limit or withhold care,
knowing that the result will very likely be the patient’s death and that the
medical responses that they are recommending contravene the patient’s
(or surrogate’s) preferences.132
O’Callaghan reports that TADA followed the failure of scholarly ef-
forts to craft an acceptable resolution to futility disputes.133 That failure is
not surprising given the thorny conflicts at the center of futility disputes.
TADA comprises an extreme response, one committed to resolving dis-
putes expeditiously but without significant concern for the price the law’s
process exacts.
Another response, or more accurately, non-response, to the concerns
that prompted promulgation of TADA is the failure to craft more effec-
tive methods for resolving futility disputes. Without that, futility disputes
can fester, sometimes for years, resulting in generalized frustration and
distress.134 Yet, for patients and surrogates, TADA may be even more
discomforting than the prolongation of dispute. The process initiated
through TADA provides certainty at the expense of the preferences of
the patient, the ongoing grief of the patient’s family and loved ones, and
the physician-patient relationship. In the wake of TADA’s imposition, pa-
tients and their families are likely to feel abandoned by their clinicians, as
well as by society and the law. TADA facilitates that abandonment by
offering absolute immunity to physicians and by precluding court review
of ethics committee determinations in futility cases.135
Other states have promulgated statutes that support the right of clini-
cians to withdraw treatments they deem futile, but none precludes court
131. O’Callaghan, supra note 120, at 571.
132. Sometimes the patient may be capable of expressing his or her preferences. In
other cases, the patient may have detailed preferences in an advance directive. And some-
times, a surrogate is expected to discern what a patient’s preferences would be in light of
the patient’s values and beliefs.
133. See O’Callaghan, supra note 120, at 535.
134. See generally, e.g., Bernstein v. Superior Court, No. B212067, 2009 WL 224924
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2009) (involving an intra-familial dispute about end-of-life care for a
patient with Alzheimer’s disease and several co-morbidities). This case and the dispute
among Karl Bernstein’s family members are analyzed in Dolgin, Medical Disputes and
Conflicting Values, supra note 81.
135. Texas Advance Directive Act § 166.046.
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review.136 Some states grant clinicians the right to refuse to provide futile
care as an instance of respect for clinicians’ conscientious objection to
providing the care requested, and others simply allow clinicians to refuse
to provide care they deem inappropriate.137 However, these laws do not
preclude court review and do not provide absolute immunity to physi-
cians. That is of great significance and may even explain the infrequency
with which physicians invoke such laws unilaterally to withhold or with-
draw patient care.138
V. WHERE NEXT?
TADA reflects an extreme response to a form of medical dispute that
has challenged patients, surrogates, and clinicians and that has often
seemed virtually intractable. In Texas, the quest for more certainty in re-
sponding to these cases has resulted in an approach that has abandoned
due process in any meaningful sense and has provided absolute immunity
for clinicians who effect the withdrawal or withholding of medical care.139
The process delineated by TADA for responding to futility disputes is
likely to comfort clinicians and hospitals, but it has come at great expense
to patient care and to individual patients and their loved ones.
There is an alternative. It requires a commitment in time and in
money.140 But it safeguards the clinician-patient relationship and respects
patients’ personhood, as well as that of the patient’s loved ones. Further,
it does not undermine patients’ constitutional rights.141 It aims to guide
the parties involved in a futility dispute to a set of compromises that all of
the stakeholders can accept.
This approach involves the active participation of hospital ethics con-
sultants142 who are trained to focus on the needs and values of each party
136. See generally Charles Sabatino, Am. Bar Ass’n: Comm’n on Law & Aging, Ad-
dress at the University of Maryland: Overview of State “Futility” Laws (Nov. 30, 2010).
137. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734 (West 2019) (offering “conscience” as ground
for refusal); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39–4514(5) (West 2019) (allowing physicians to refuse to
provide care deemed futile).
138. See Pope, supra note 84, at 68.
139. See O’Callaghan, supra note 120, at 537.
140. See infra note 142 (acknowledging, as well, expenses that may be mitigated
through ethics consultations).
141. O’Callaghan suggests that TADA violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment on three grounds. O’Callaghan, supra note 120, at 530. She contends
that the law is unconstitutionally vague, that it precludes review of futility cases by an
“unbiased forum,” and that it contravenes the “balancing test” of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976), by failing to place the patient’s “interest in access” to procedural
protections above the state’s interest in “granting . . . carte blanche” to hospital ethics
committees in futility cases. Id. at 530–31.
142. Ethics consultants may be members of hospital ethics committees. The work of
ethics consultants and ethics committee members generally overlaps. Ethics committees
now exist in the vast majority of U.S. hospitals. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing:
Healthcare Ethics Committees, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 74, 76 (2011) (noting that the Joint
Commission required hospitals to have ethics committees or other groups doing compara-
ble work). Ethics committees are composed of volunteers, many of whom work at the
hospital as clinicians or in some other capacity. They focus on “education, policy develop-
ment and care review.” Judith Hendrick, Legal Aspects of Clinical Ethics Committees, 27 J.
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involved in hospital disputes, to encourage discourse among all of the
stakeholders, and to explain the needs and values of each participant to
the others. Ethics consultants, who may work in teams or as individuals,
are not simply members of hospitals’ ethics committees. The American
Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) now recommends that eth-
ics consultants receive certification in a process that requires a certifica-
tion examination.143 ASBH expects ethics consultants to “address
uncertainty or conflict” among “patients, families, surrogates, health care
providers, or other involved parties.”144
The ASBH further recommends that ethics consultants help “elucidate
issues, aid effective communication, and integrate the perspectives of the
relevant stakeholders.”145 This approach is compelling insofar as it recog-
nizes the essential personhood and respects the perspective of each stake-
holder. This work is done best when contingencies afford the luxury of
time for attention to detail and nuance.146 Even though that is not always
the case, ethics consultations—when successful—shift goals, broaden per-
spectives, and encourage disputants to listen to one another and shape
compromises to which all can agree.
Since ethics consultations are not always successful, the right to obtain
court review must be available to the stakeholders. Judicial review is ex-
pensive, time-consuming, and often emotionally difficult. But it affords
stakeholders the right to have their voices heard by assessors who are
presumptively more objective than members of hospital ethics commit-
tees—the committees whose review substitutes for court review pursuant
to TADA.147 Further, ethics committee deliberations are not necessarily
guided by rules of fair process. At least in theory, court proceedings are.
Further, court decisions can be appealed, offering disputants another
layer of protection—another opportunity to be heard.148
When ethics consultants resolve disputes successfully, the stakeholders
avoid the expense and tension of court proceedings. But when compro-
mise cannot be reached, it is essential that parties have the right to court
review. The process delineated in TADA will generally provide a practi-
MED. ETHICS i50, i51 (2001). Ethics consultants have generally received focused training in
hospital ethics work. They work in clinical settings to resolve specific disputes. Salla Saxen,
Untangling Uncertainty: A Study of the Discourses Shaping Clinical Ethics Consultation as a
Professional Practice, 27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 99, 99 (2016).
143. See Healthcare Ethics Certification Examination Content Outline and Item Devel-
opment, AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN., http://asbh.org/certification/content-out-
line [https://perma.cc/7PC4-DQPA] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
144. AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN., CORE COMPETENCIES FOR HEALTHCARE
ETHICS CONSULTATION 2–3 (2d ed. 2011).
145. Id. at 7.
146. Among other things, this depends on the state of the patient’s medical condition
and the consequent need (or not) to make decisions as quickly as possible.
147. See Harold L. Hirsch & Richard E. Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-Legal
Implications of In Re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 267, 282–83 (1977) (discussing the
composition and potential biases of ethics committees).
148. Legal intervention has disadvantages. One is the tendency to transform moral dis-
putes into legalisms. See Hendrick, supra note 142, at i51.
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cal resolution to a futility dispute more quickly than the process of atten-
tive ethics consultation, followed, if unsuccessful, by judicial review. But
the costs are onerous to patients whose preferences are not respected, to
family members who feel abandoned, and even to clinicians who are ab-
solved from engaging with the moral dimensions of medical decision-
making.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bioethical disputes often occasion difficult questions. Both Quinlan
and Cruzan raised difficult questions. When those cases were decided,
few would have foreseen a future, not long off, in which clinicians sought
the discontinuation of life-sustaining care and patients or surrogates
sought the continuation of care. Disputes about medical care deemed fu-
tile (“inappropriate,” “ineffective,” “not medically indicated”)149 by a pa-
tient’s clinicians are especially challenging.
Futility disputes directly implicate choices about life and death. They
are hedged by uncertainty about the identification of those with the au-
thority to make decisions; about the moral dimensions each dispute
presents; and, often, about the patient’s prognosis should life-sustaining
care be continued (or discontinued). Disagreement among the stakehold-
ers—often including the patient or the patient’s surrogate, family mem-
bers, or dear friends; the patient’s clinicians; and perhaps even the
hospital in which the patient is receiving care—can be intense and pro-
foundly discomforting. At the same time, those who love the patient may
experience grief, even as the patient lies dying but is not yet dead. Thus,
lawmakers, medical professionals, and others have struggled to delineate
guidelines for resolving futility disputes.
There is no single “solution” to these disputes. The processes through
which they are resolved are often as important as the conclusions
reached. Yet, the pressure to find a solution should not trump the signifi-
cance of safeguarding constitutional protections and respect for all of the
stakeholders.
The pressures and underlying uncertainties that often attend futility
disputes may facilitate construction of responses that do not serve the
stakeholders as individuals and as a group. At one extreme, responses
that fail to encourage and guide discourse among the stakeholders too
often result in the prolongation of disputes about the care provided to
dying, unconscious patients hooked to tubes and unable to participate in
life in a meaningful manner. That scenario can occasion anguish for all of
the stakeholders. The other extreme—an approach crafted around rigid
guidelines that impose certainty at the expense of discourse among the
stakeholders and at the expense of the dignity of patients and of other
stakeholders—also results in dissatisfaction and anguish. TADA repre-
sents this second type of response.
149. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
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Both extremes—those that facilitate prolongation of the status quo be-
cause accommodations cannot be reached and those that impose signifi-
cant limitations on stakeholders’ rights—ultimately fail to serve those
involved in futility disputes. The responses are very different. Yet, each
reflects the obstacles that make futility disputes especially difficult to re-
solve. Responding to futility disputes wisely requires the capacity to me-
diate moral differences, attention to nuance, and tolerance for ambiguity.
Well-trained ethics consultants generally understand and value those
traits. Even so, the right of court review for stakeholders left unsatisfied
is essential. This broad approach to futility disputes—as well, of course,
as to many other bioethical disputes—is time-consuming and potentially
expensive. But in the context of life and death decisions that will affect
the care of patients and the continuing emotional responses of patients’
loved ones and clinicians, nothing less can be justified.
